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TOWARD A THEORY OF BUSINESS LEVEL STRATEGY RESEARCH

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to call for sensitivity about
what the nature of theory is (or could be) in the field of
strategic management. The author presents the view that
strategy is part orderly and therefore is amenable to stipulating causal mechanisms and it is also part "art" which
will demand different thinking and methods. One example is
given of a theory of business level strategy and research
that could blend both views. A larger purpose is to make a
call for having authors state clearly what the key features
of their theories are so that open debate about them can
be accomplished.

TOWARD A THEORY OF BUSINESS LEVEL STRATEGY RESEARCH
The term theory from the title above stems from the Greek word (theoria)
which means enlightened reflection from a ground of a set of first premises.
To the more modern thinker, the term theory usually suggests a structure of
first premises, coupled with a set of causal laws or mechanisms such that if
initial conditions are known, a conclusion can be made.

For example, if we

have
1.

Newton's Laws (Premise and Causal Laws)

2.

Position of the Seven Planets and the Relation to the Sun
(Initial Conditions)

Therefore, posit another planet - Neptune (Kuhn, 1957:261)

The term strategy stems from the Greek word (strategos) meaning the art of the
general.
The three main terms presented in the definitions above - theory, strate~

and art - portray an underlying tension in the modern academic study of
The science in academic research ought to, if not, does

business strategy.
strive for theories.

Here, premises are laid open for inspection, causal laws

are hypothesized from previous theory or hunches and then tested, so that reasoned, calculated and probability constrained conclusions can be drawn.

The

art in the definition of strategy, on the other hand, drives us to consider
surprise, crisis, novelty, uniqueness, disorder and chaos-sort of an effervescence which is ever in the process of becoming (May, 1975; Arieti, 1976).
Therein is the tension:

if theory drives us to consider what is orderly

and art drives us to consider what is chaotic or disorderly, can there ever be
a reconcilement?

Does one necessarily preclude the other?

In fact, if we are
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to study that which is held to be the essence of strategy -- uniqueness as it
relates to comparative advantage and distinctive image (Andrews, 1980; Henderson, 1983; South, 1980), then perhaps we need to be studying the renegades or
outliers, (the "art"), and not the firms that will allow significant correlations between two variables to be had.

The writer feels that there are the

pieces to begin to build a world view for strategy and strategy research that
will ask us to develop theories -

premises and causal laws - but will also

allow us to consider the art within.

In explicating these pieces certain no-

tions from the philosophy of science literature will be addressed.

These con-

cerns follow naturally from considering the pieces.
A.

A Scheme for Strategy Research
To hold that the study of strategy is one of art, is to hold, in the ex-

treme case, that no order or structure exists on which to build premises and
causal laws.

Subscribers to this position hold that surprise, crisis, etc.

characterize reality better than an orderly state of affairs.

However, the

very notions of surprise, etc. presuppose some notion of order or regularity.
Otherwise, "chaotic" (or "artistic··) conditions would be the order or the
norm.

So, the most fundamental premise that some order exists (or is thought

to exist) that has a chance to be known seems inescapable, at least for Western thinking.

(Bourgeois, 1980; see Churchman, 1971 for a catalog of modes of

rationality.)

If this is true, then perhaps we can construe part of a theory

of strategy (and strategy itself) to be lawlike and part as that which is random, chaotic and ever in the process of becoming - a sort of effervescence.
This can be seen as a derivative of Thompson's argument (1967) for the protection of the technical core.

Figure 1 shows this notion graphically.

Here, we

have a nucleus of strategy that is thought to be lawlike - a dominant thrust
that exists by virtue of the firm having successfully come to terms with the
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FIGURE 1
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contingencies posed by the environment.

A snapshot picture of this dominant

thrust at any point in time for the successful firm would appear to respect
tradition ("rules of the game," Porter, 1980) and the particular laws of the
marketplace and environment that are germane to the firm's particular situaSecondly, we have what the writer calls the diversionary scree.1

tion.

This

notion and construct accommodates the art in strategy by being the apparatus
that responds to newer, random, chaotic perhaps bizarre demands posed by the
environment (Porter, 1980:

Chapter 4).

The topics of the dominant thrust and

the diversionary scree will be taken up in greater detail in the next section,
but what is proposed here is a dual structure of strategy formulation and perhaps even implementation.

The concerns of the dominant thrust point to a no-

tion that there needs to be a rather natural fit between strategy and the contingencies posed by the environment.

To use a natural analogy, the taproot

and lifeblood of the firm's strategy (its dominant thrust) cannot be tampered
with indiscriminately and must be cultivated through time.

On the other hand,

the concerns of the diversionary scree demand ephemeral, transitory sort of
activity.

This would respect the very nature of diversion and perhaps the

term "art" if we understand it in its uniqueness and novelty meaning.
Given these premises and arguments, what would be a way of thinking about
building a theory of strategy?

The cumulative implications of the above ana-

lysis would suggest that we consider the following:
1.

A definition of what is strategic.

This should be couched in generic

attribute terms so as to allow for guidance and the testing of causal
mechanisms.
2.

Presentation

of a relatively open and systemic model of strategy.

This would, among other things, increase the probability of encompassing the requisite causal mechanisms.

(See Bigler, 1983 for an
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argument for construing strategy in more systemic terms and Henderson, 1983 for support of this argument.)
3.

The definition of what is strategic (1 above) and the specification
of an open model for strategy (2 above) must also allow a statement
of what theory of the firm is implied or posited.

For example does a

particular definition of what is strategic and its appropriate open
model reflect a theory of the firm that says that management should
maximize shareholder value (Copeland and Weston, 1983), or maximize
presence in the marketplace (BCG) or minimize cost curves in terms of
the factors of production (Coase, 1937).

This up front construal of

which theory of the firm a particular theory of strategy reflects
could add to clarifying the ground or base of the theorist's endeavor.
4.

Isolate key causal mechanisms within this system that reflect the generic definition of what is strategic, then rigorously test for these
causal mechanisms.

This more ''basic" research, as opposed to "ap-

plied" research could form the building blocks to a more general
theory of strategy.

This will be relatively more detached and cir-

cumscribed research but it could be very foundational for our field.
5.

To be able to actually test the causal mechanisms, a way must be made
to operationalize the key constructs in the systemic model.

The con-

structs should be operationalized in terms of more abstract attributes that will allow interval level measurement.

For example, some

way needs to be advanced to adequately measure such things as environmental diversity, munificence and dynamism (Dess, 1980; Bigler,
1982) and strategic diversity.

For example, a frequency count of

problematic environmental components could be done, but this would be
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cumbersome and would not allow the testing of causal or correlational
relationships.

The relatively abstract attributes of environmental

diversity, dynamism and abundance could, if properly operationalized,
serve as proxies for actual environmental contingencies.

This proce-

dure (for all parts of the model) could allow for interval (as opposed to nominal) level measurement and relational analysis.
Figure 2 shows in schematic form what one theory of strategy would look
like given the explication above.

As one can see, this is a rather "natural-

ist" construal of a theory of strategy.
sented.

No doubt other theories can be pre-

What is intended here is to show a rather lean form in which theo-

rists can present in a clear and parsimonius manner what the underlying key
features of their theories are.
The above presentation may indicate a stable picture for strategy and
strategy research.

However, there exists a tradeoff in this presentation that

needs to be respected in doing research (as indeed in actually doing strategy).

It is the omnipresence of risk that makes any theory of strategy at best

dynamic and at worst unstable.
borne in this strategic system.
thrust.

There are two types of risk that are always
There is a risk that is borne in the dominant

If the dominant thrust is a maximization construct and respects his-

toric tradition, then it sets itself up for the risk of catastrophic loss.
There is a risk that a sudden shift in the environment may completely nullify
a previously successful, internally consistent dominant thrust (see the HBS
Case Service for examples of Winnebago or Vermont Tubbs).
that is borne by the diversionary scree.

There is also risk

If this component of our system

seeks optimal diversity, there is the risk that the firm may spread itself too
thinly, even though conventional portfolio considerations have been designed
appropriately.

That is, the portfolio may be structured so that risk (here
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Figure 2
AN EXAMPLE OF A THEORY OF STRATEGY
GENERIC DEFINITION OF WHAT IS STRATEGIC:
That which relates the firm to the contingencies posed by the environment.
OPEN AND SYSTEMIC MODEL OF STRATEGY:
Environment---->Strategy---->Performance
KEY CAUSAL MECHANISMS:

(Examples Only)

1.

Internal Strategic Diversity should match environmental diversity for
high performance and effectiveness. (Ashby, 1956.)

2.

Performance as measured by return on assets is inversely related to
the amount of competition posed by the industry. (Porter, 1980.)

3.

Expected returns should be commensurate with risk.

HOW TO OPERATIONALIZE STRATEGY:
Strategy Content Should Maximize the Actuality or Presentation of:
Distinctive Competence
and/or
Comparative Advantage
Subject to:
Synergy and
Resources
This maximization construct would suggest some sort of dominant thrust
notion for strategy (Yavitz and Newman, 1982). One way to think about it
would be in terms of a "fit" of the key sub-system components that go to make
up the dominant thrust. This could be a fundamental clustering of the strateB!£ inputs of each of the traditional functional areas (marketing, finance,
production, etc.).
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measured as variance and covariance of historic returns) is appropriate for
the level of return or that the overall sensitivity of the portfolio to the
market is appropriate for the desired or expected return, but it may leave the
portfolio too sparsely structured to be managed properly.
tradeoff.

Figure 3 shows this

It reiterates the fact that some risk is always borne by the stra-

tegic system:

in a dynamic environment, the solution probably lies in some

sort of equilibrium through time.

How this equilibrium is brought about is

beyond the scope of this paper but it probably is a result of how well the
management knows the actuality and intent of its own system and what the sensitivity of that system is to changes in the environment.

For example, do

perceived strategy and structure coincide usefully with actual strategy and
structure?

Secondly, what has been the intent and actuality of management to

change strategy and structure as the environment changes?

This "reflexivity"

requirement charges management with knowing their organizations in terms of
not only the actuality of strategy and structure but also the intent of the
thrust to align strategy and structure with the dictates of the environment.
If this prescription is valid, then it brings choice (the ability to apperceive usefully can be thought of as one of the inputs to choice [Nisbett and
Ross, 1980]) squarely into our model and theory of strategic management.
Aldrich, 1978 for a contrary argument.)

(See

Information systems, organizational

culture, leadership style and the imposition of a super-ordinate goal are design variables that can be thought to enhance "reflexivity."*

*The writer is working on a paper that will delve into the construct of
reflexivity in more detail.
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FIGURE 3
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What does all of this mean for a theory of strategy research?

The posi-

tion has been made here that any strategic apparatus is composed of dominant
thrust and diversionary scree activity to help the firm protect itself from
the contingencies posed by the environment.

No matter what the tradeoff be-

tween the two modes of activity are, strategy content (by this "naturalist"
account; Andrews, 1980) should maximize the actuality or the presentation of
comparative advantage and distinctive image.

Secondly, there is always some

risk that is borne by this sytem; the risk of catastrophic loss and the risk
of maximal diversity straining the administrative capability of management.
If we necessarily need to understand this entire strategy apparatus as an open
system, we have, as yet, no developed frameworks and techniques to help us in
this regard.

Henderson (1983) has sketched a program of what this would en-

tail, (industrial dynamics, Forester, 1963; biological evolutionary theory,
Hirshleifer, 1978) but his is a first excursion and thereby rather sketchy.
B.

How the Model Might Relate to Practice
Perhaps a brief overview of how the model might fit together would be, in

order.

This rather "naturalist" strategic system is seen as determining

conventional criteria of effectiveness (such as market share), not the mere
vehicle by which market share is enhanced.

In other words, market share is

the outcome of maneuvering this system through time and through the vicissitudes posed by the environment --market share is not the raison d'etre of
strategy (Abell, 1980).

If this naturalist presentation is valid then the

dominant thrust of core skills, comparative advantages and distinctive competences remain relatively enduring (for the successful firm) while feints (market signalling), responding to legitimacy attacks, meeting diversity with diversity, etc., can be offered by the diversionary scree.

As mentioned before,

this diversionary scree can be thought of as all the rather ephemeral tactics
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that a firm can employ, whether they be in marketing, finance or production.
To illustrate some dynamics, if the dominant thrust would be moving in one direction, the diversionary scree could be made to appear random, or could be
thrown one for one against the contingencies posed by the environment or could
be made to appear to move in the opposite direction.
in the truest sense of the word.

This would be diversion

Following Thompson's argument then, the di-

versionary scree is what would take in and respond to most of the contingencies posed by the environment.

Following this naturalist line of reasoning,

if the dominant thrust of the organization is ever compromised (CEO dying, major technological shift or act of god) the firm should desist and employ its
assets elsewhere.
"dead dog.••

In this extreme state the firm could be classified as a

But if the shock is absorbed by the diversionary scree, the firm

could be taking losses but could be classified as a "living dog•• because its
taproot of the dominant thrust has not been "cut•• or seriously compromised.
In other words, the firm could still supply value to some set of stakeholders
and if the firm is part of a corporate portfolio it should not be divested
(Freeman, 1984).
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article was to provide a discussion of what
of strategy and strategy research could look like.

~

theory

Its intent was to provide

input for debate on where strategy research (or at least some part of scholarly endeavor) could begin to move.

The position was made that strategy re-

search should begin to move to building middle range theory.

The interest is

not so much on building theory for theory's sake, but that if theory is construed as a position on:
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1.

A set of premises

2.

A set of causal laws

3.

Initial conditions

4.

Conclusions or prescriptions

then the field can begin to test for causal laws (at whatever level of generality) and begin to move from anecdotal evidence to evidence that is more in
line with making the field a discipline (by conventional standards).
In a skeleton form, the position was made that a theory should begin with
a definition of what is strategic, make premises known, present a relatively
systemic model and make necessary the testing of causal mechanism and linkages.

One example was given that considered strategy and the firm as a living

organism that has certain characteristics -- a dominant thrust and a diversionary scree in some sort of alignment with its environment.

In this view,

the system's integrity comes first, that is, its position in the marketplace
cannot be ephemeral (although it can be weak in the case of a small or newer
firm).2

Effectiveness measures such as market share, return on investment and

perhaps even productivity and morale necessarily follow.

If these arguments

are valid, the following are suggested for strategy research:
1.

The constructs of dominant thrust and diversionary scree should be
delved into separately when doing both content and process research.
These two constructs may be fundamentally different in terms of long
and short term durability (diversionary scree tactics are by their
nature ephemeral) and their effects on long run profitability (diversionary scree tactics will certainly decrease short run profits by
protecting the dominant thrust).

2.

The process by which we come to understand the dynamics within the
constructs of the dominant thrust and diversionary scree may be very
different. Dominant thrust .activity for the older firm will allow,
in fact demand, longitudinal research design. Diversionary scree
tactics, being transitory, can probably only be approached by crosssectional designs.
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These propositions may serve to untangle some of the problems in some past
strategy research.

If these constructs are in fact sufficiently different by

nature, then mixing the two in the same operationalization of strategy may only produce confusion.
with one another.

In fact, these two constructs may be at cross purposes

We need some appropriate theoretical and operational work

to set boundaries on dominant thrust and diversionary scree activity.
This view can certainly be debated, but at least we as a field can begin
to have something to debate.

Perhaps various schools of thought could emerge

that could supply rallying points for good and healthy debate.
were implicitly presented here school.

Two schools

a "naturalist" school and a "randomness"

No doubt other views and schools exist.

Perhaps we could start mak-

ing premises explicit, developing theories arid schools of thought, and begin
moving our field to discipline status, if this is indeed important.
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ENDNOTES
1The term scree is borrowed from Cattell's (1960) usage of the term as it
applies to the Scree Test in factor analysis. Scree in actual usage is that
rubble that falls down the side of a mountain and collects at its base. This
author, like Cattell, is using this term for the visual aspects it conveys.
2An ephemeral position in the marketplace, by this naturalist account,
is one that develops from a lack of an internally consistent dominant thrust
that does not align with the contingencies posed by the environment. Newer
and perhaps smaller firms will not have had the occasion to be as entrenched
as older firms, but in order to be viable, a "reflexive" management will be
putting into place the dominant thrust capability early in the game.
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